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Abstract 
 
Individuals investing in a Venture Capital Trust IPO listed on the London Stock Exchange receive a number 
of conditional tax incentives; the time related nature of the associated conditions can create a ‘lock-in effect’. 
By deriving and testing a model of the value of these incentives we examine how they influence investors’ 
pricing and trading decisions. This paper contributes to the ongoing tax capitalisation debate in three ways: 
first, in calculating the magnitude of the lock-in effect without reference to underlying shareholder records; 
second, in adopting a time series approach – in view of the time varying magnitude of the potential lock-in 
effect - and thereby avoiding control issues involved in cross-sectional analysis of the effects of taxation on 
pricing; and third, by focusing on changes in the bid-ask spread rather than, for example, mid-price, so 
reducing the impact of changes in the market value of the instruments under consideration on the analysis. 
Our results have direct policy implications in suggesting a conflict between the existence of time related 
conditional tax incentives and the requirement for VCTs to be listed on the London Stock Exchange 
explicitly in order to promote liquidity in a historically illiquid sector of the market. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Successive UK governments, like their counterparts in the US, The Netherlands and elsewhere have 
attempted to use tax-based incentives to correct a perceived market failure in the provision of finance to 
small, unquoted companies. One such scheme in the UK promotes the use of Venture Capital Trusts (VCTs). 
An explicit aim of the VCT legislation is the provision of an exit strategy to investors thereby reducing one 
source of the potential market failure (HM Inland Revenue, 2002). Consequently, VCTs are required to be 
listed on the London Stock Exchange. We report, however, that the secondary market in VCT shares is 
characterised by low levels of market liquidity as indicated by typically low trading volumes. This paper 
examines whether investors’ pricing and trading decisions can be explained in terms of tax considerations 
and, therefore, whether the design the VCT legislation (and associated tax legislation) is a potential source of 
the low liquidity.  
 
Individuals investing in a VCT IPO receive a number of conditional tax incentives including, most 
significantly, ‘investment relief’ – an income tax rebate based on the sum initially invested. To reduce the 
potential benefits of ‘tax avoidance’, a repayment or ‘clawback’ of the rebate can arise if the shares in the 
VCT are sold within a ‘required holding’ period (HM Treasury, 2003). This paper derives a model of the 
present value of the conditional tax incentive during the currency of the required holding period, and then 
tests empirically a number of predictions about market behaviour based on this model. 
 
The issue of the impact of taxation on asset prices has been subject to considerable academic 
investigation. There remains, however, a lack of consensus over, in particular, the impact of investor level 
taxes and share prices – see, for example, Harris and Kemsley (1999), Harris et al. (2001), Collins and 
Kemsley (2000), Dhaliwal et al. (2003) and Hanlon et al. (2003). This study focuses on the impact of 
investor level conditional tax incentives and has parallels in the analysis of capital gains tax. In particular, 
when the taxation of gains is limited to realised gains, shareholders are provided with an incentive to defer 
the realisation of a gain, i.e., a ‘lock-in effect’ is created (Stiglitz, 2000).1 Klein (2001) demonstrates that 
potential sellers of shares with an unrealised gain demand a higher price than they would have done for the 
shares without any such unrealised gain - in order to cover the capital gains tax liability which would 
crystallize on sale. Examining price reaction around an unexpected reduction in the length of the capital 
gains holding period, Blouin et al. (2002) document empirical evidence consistent with Klein (2001). 
Announcement date abnormal returns were, on average, negative for those (IPO) firms benefiting most from 
the change. Inconsistent with a tax explanation, however, the losses were reversed almost immediately - in 
fact, the following day. Earlier work by Landsman and Shackelford (1995) on the RJR Nabisco leveraged 
buyout confirmed that shareholders with higher unrealised gains demanded higher prices (the authors’ access 
to confidential shareholder records allowing them to observe directly shareholders’ unrealised or locked-in 
gains). In order to identify shares trading at an unrealised gain in the absence of access to shareholder 
                                                 
1 Lock-in effects can arise in other tax settings, for example, under corporation tax settings in the context of disposal of 
assets on which capital or investment allowances have been granted; or in the context of the decision as to whether or 
not to continue trading where there exist past trading taxation losses which are yet to be utilised. 
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records, Blouin et al. (2002) follow Reese (1998) in focusing on recent IPOs and assume no change in the 
initial shareholding distribution. 
 
Our results confirm the existence of a lock-in effect, consistent with findings of low trading volumes, 
and have direct policy relevance on two aspects. First, the resulting disincentive to trade reduces liquidity, 
thereby potentially reducing VCTs’ ability to attract funding and increasing their cost of capital; and second, 
the lock-in effect inhibits VCT investors from re-investing in more profitable activities, thus creating a 
welfare loss (Stiglitz, 2000). The results may be summarized as follows. First, VCT bid-ask spreads evolve 
over time in a way consistent with investment relief being capitalised, and the bid-ask spread increases as the 
present value of the investment relief increases. As the present value increases over time, VCT shareholders 
require an increasingly higher price if they are to sell within the required holding period and, thus, forfeit 
their investment relief. Potential secondary market purchasers, however, are not entitled to investment relief 
and are, therefore, only willing to pay a price that is independent of any investment relief consideration.2 
Second, VCT spreads fall significantly and the number of customer bargains increases significantly 
following the end of the required holding period, consistent with the cessation of the lock-in effect. Third, 
spread is greater for VCTs with a three-year as opposed to a five-year required holding period - consistent 
with the present value of the investment relief being higher the shorter the holding period. And fourth, VCT 
spread and volume traded are, respectively, greater than and less than spread and volume traded for a non-
VCT comparator sample – for which comparator sample, in the absence of specific tax incentives, there is no 
tax-related required holding period. Overall these results are consistent with Landsman and Shackelford 
(1995), Klein (2001) and Blouin et al. (2002). We argue, however, that they present stronger evidence of a 
lock-in effect, this being facilitated by the setting for our study. 
 
In addition to its policy relevance, our study contributes to the lock-in literature principally in three 
respects. First, by calculating the magnitude of the lock-in effect with certainty, yet without reference to 
underlying shareholder records - which allows examination of a broader sample than would be likely to be 
available were access to confidential shareholders’ records required. Second, in adopting a time series 
approach – in view of the time varying magnitude of the potential lock-in effect - and thereby avoiding 
control issues involved in cross-sectional analysis of the effects of taxation on pricing. And third, by 
focusing on changes in the bid-ask spread rather than, for example, mid-price, so reducing the impact of 
changes in the market value of the instruments under consideration on the analysis. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: the next section discusses VCTs, the method of their issue and associated 
taxation regulation; the third section develops a theoretical model for the valuation of VCT investment relief; 
the fourth section describes the data, hypothesis and research method; the results are presented and discussed 
in the fifth section; and the final section concludes. 
                                                 
2 In that the relief is only available to initial subscribers it is similar to the reduced rate of capital gains on qualified 
small business stock in the US. Guenther and Willenborg (1999) conclude that on the introduction of the reduced rate of 
capital gains tax the issue price of qualifying stock increased - consistent to a reduction in small business’s cost of 
capital. In focussing on the impact of conditional tax incentives, the public policy issue addressed in this paper differs 
from that addressed by Guenther and Willenborg (1999). 
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2. Legislative and institutional background 
 
Legislation establishing VCTs was included in the UK Finance Act 1995, and the first VCT was created in 
November 1995. The term ‘trust’ is, strictly, a misnomer – since, in order to be approved as VCTs under the 
Finance Act 1995, they are required to be public limited companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange. 
Approval under the 1995 Act results in two distinct sets of tax reliefs – shareholder-level reliefs and firm-
level reliefs. Critical to this analysis, shareholder-level reliefs are restricted to private individuals, thereby 
excluding the possibility that the (rational) marginal shareholder could be a tax-exempt organisation.3 The 
terms of approval are given in S.70, Finance Act 1995, and are primarily concerned with the composition of 
the assets held by the VCT4, size of holding5 and size of companies in which it invests.6 The legislation also 
specifies approved trades, in order to direct investment away from relatively low risk asset-backed 
investment ventures towards risky activities which may, otherwise, experience difficulty in attracting 
investment. 
 
The requirement that all VCTs must be quoted on the London Stock Exchange is designed to provide 
investors with a ready market for assets with typically illiquid underlying investments and thereby reduce the 
risks associated with unquoted investments.7, 8 Individual investors may obtain a number of tax reliefs when 
investing in VCTs. Original subscribers (but not secondary market purchasers) can obtain income tax relief 
at a rate of 20 percent on the cost of their original investment - referred to as ‘investment relief’ for the 
purposes of this paper - conditional upon the shares being held by the individual for a required holding 
period. This required holding period was originally five years, but was reduced (non-retrospectively) to three 
years for seasoned and unseasoned issues occurring on or after 6th April 2000. If the shares are disposed of 
before the expiration of the required holding period a ‘clawback’ of the income tax occurs, based on the 
lesser of amount invested or disposal proceeds. Additionally, a subscription to acquire VCT shares can, 
subject to certain conditions being satisfied, be used to defer a tax gain realised on a non-VCT asset when the 
gain is, effectively, reinvested in VCT shares. Following the introduction in the UK Finance Act 1998 of 
                                                 
3 In general, financial institutions dominate the ownership of UK quoted companies. As at 31 December 2001 UK tax-
exempt pension funds held 16% of the market value of the London Stock Exchange and UK insurance companies 
whose business also includes tax-exempt pension funds held a further 32%. The largest shareholding group was non-
UK institutions and individuals, which held 50% (Office of National Statistics, 2002). 
4 After allowing a three-year period in which to identify and appraise potential investments, at least 70% of the VCT’s 
investments must comprise new issues in unquoted trading companies. Of this 70%, at least 30% must be in the form of 
equity, and the balance may be preference or debt capital. 
5 In an attempt to ensure a diversified portfolio, no single holding may exceed 15% of the VCT’s investments. 
6 In order to target investment at small, unquoted funds, there is an upper limit on the size of companies in which VCTs 
may invest. Immediately prior to investment by the VCT, the gross assets of the investment target company must not 
exceed £15m; and immediately after, they may not exceed £16m (prior to 6th April 1998 the corresponding figures were 
£10m and £11m). 
7 Discussions with VCT managers indicate, however, that VCT investors rarely consider exit strategy options at the 
time of initial subscription. This view is consistent with the findings reported in PACEC (2003). 
8 Liquidity could also be provided under general powers available to all limited companies (S.163, Companies Act 
1985) to make market purchases or buy-backs of their own shares. All of the eighteen VCTs focused upon in Table 4 
(see subsequent discussion) have adopted such powers. The terms of the permitted buy-backs, based on a review of the 
buy-back terms of ten of the eighteen VCTs, indicates that the maximum price permitted is based on 105% of mid-
market price (6 VCTS) or the lower of 105% of the mid-market price and net asset value (4 VCTs). Clearly, under both 
mechanisms of price determination, the conditional form of the investment relief will still create a lock-in effect - 
although taking a mid-market price reduces its magnitude. 
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taper relief (for capital gains tax calculation purposes), the ability to defer a gain is now of less significance 
to potential investors - particularly in relation to gains on business assets. 9 
 
Further relief is given by an exemption from capital gains tax in respect of any gain on disposal of shares 
in VCTs, and by exemption from income tax upon dividends received from VCTs. For the purpose of this 
paper, these two reliefs are together referred to as ‘return reliefs’. The return reliefs are available to all 
individual UK tax paying shareholders10, irrespective of whether they acquired their shareholding by direct 
subscription or by purchase in the subsequent secondary market. 
 
Therefore, in subscribing for shares in a VCT an investor is acquiring four distinct assets or rights: (i) a 
share of the VCT’s net assets; (ii) the right to investment relief; (iii) the possibility of roll-over relief; and 
(iv) the right to return reliefs. Of these, the second and third cannot be acquired by a secondary market 
purchaser. 
 
Since a subscriber forfeits the right to investment relief upon selling VCT shares within the required 
holding period, and since investment relief may not be transferred to purchasers in the secondary market, we 
deduce that the secondary market in a VCT share will be characterised by high bid-ask spread and low 
trading volume during the required holding period for that share. A market maker will only offer to sell VCT 
shares for a price at which he / she can readily obtain (or replace) such shares in the market: this price will 
include, to some extent, an element reflecting the value of investment relief rights of original subscribers. 
Potential purchasers, by contrast, will place no value on investment relief and will not be prepared to pay for 
it. Once the required holding period for the share is over, we may expect to see a lower bid-offer spread and 
consequently higher trading volume. 
 
We would expect, therefore, that the quoted prices for VCTs in the secondary market to comprise the 
following elements: market value of underlying VCT assets; conventional discount (or premium) upon the 
market value of underlying assets, as per the literature on investment trusts in general; expected value of 
return reliefs; conventional marker makers’ spread; and spread attributable to the expected value of 
investment reliefs. 
 
As at 6th April 2002, sixty-eight VCTs had been listed on the LSE Twelve of these had more than one 
class of share, thus giving a total of eighty VCT quotations.11 Table 1 analyses this population by year of 
issue. 
                                                 
9 In his budget speech, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced on 17th March 2004 a series of changes to the nature 
of the tax incentives. For shares issued on or after 6 April 2004 the rate of income tax relief for investments was to be 
increased from 20% to 40%; capital gains tax deferral relief was no longer available for gains reinvested in VCT; and 
the annual taxpayer VCT investment limits was raised from £100,000 to £200,000. These changes recognised the 
primacy of income tax related reliefs over gain deferral or roll over relief. 
10 Subject originally to an upper investment limit of £100,000 per fiscal year per individual, later raised (see previous 
footnote).  
11 The use of multiple classes is designed to avoid value dilution on subsequent issues. For example, Foresight 
Technology VCT plc has two categories of ordinary share. The company maintains and disclosures a separate balance 
sheet and income statement relating to each category, thereby permitting their separate and independent valuation. 
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*** insert Table 1 about here *** 
 
The apparent importance of the tax benefits to shareholders is evidenced in that 32 of the flotations 
occurred in either March or April, late in the fiscal year - reducing uncertainty over individuals’ tax positions 
and marginal tax rates, and also minimising financing costs. Based on a survey of 496 VCT investors, ‘the 
single most attractive feature’ of the scheme is the income tax relief based on the initial subscription (41% of 
investors) followed by the CGT deferral (23% of investors); whereas the income tax exemption on dividends 
and the CGT exemption on disposal of shares in VCTs where described as ‘the single most attractive feature’ 
of VCTs by 4% and 18% of investors respectively (PACEC, 2003). 
 
 
3. Valuation of VCT investment relief 
 
We turn now to the formulation of a theoretical model for valuation of investment relief. Consider 
an individual investor, UK resident for taxation purposes, who subscribes amount I in a VCT at 
time t0 during fiscal year FY0, on which amount he / she expects income tax relief at rate T0  
 
The value of investment relief is not certain to the investor until the end of the required holding period 
since, for example, the investor’s circumstances may change and he or she may become a distressed seller. 
Suppose that: 
 
(i) the risk free rate is f per time period 
(ii) personal taxation payable in respect of fiscal year FYi is due at time t’i (in the UK, personal 
taxation is payable by 31st January following the fiscal year to which the tax relates) 
(iii) the rate of interest upon tax ‘clawed back’ in respect of tax reliefs previously enjoyed but, 
retrospectively, no longer allowable is c per period (simple interest, as under tax legislation) and 
(iv) the rate per period which represents discount rate for risk appropriate to investment relief is r 
 
The cash flow benefit of investment relief is, therefore, IT0, to be enjoyed at time t’0. The value of this 
investment relief to the investor in the period before he / she receives the cash flow benefit is the expected 
benefit appropriately discounted. In the period after receiving the cash flow benefit, but whilst still within the 
required holding period, the value is the potential liability for overdue tax (i.e., the cash outflow which will 
be suffered should the VCT holding be sold)12. Once beyond this holding period, the value disappears. 
 
The VCT subscriber, however, might divest the holding (or part thereof) before the end of the required 
holding period for a price which is below the original subscription price. In such a case the ‘clawback’ of 
investment relief is restricted to divestment proceeds at the income tax relief rate previously enjoyed, plus 
                                                 
12 We assume rationality in the repayment of overdue tax, that is, given the usual level of clawback interest rate in 
comparison to expected risk adjusted asset returns, that overdue tax will be paid immediately a liability is recognised. 
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interest. So in the period between point of cash flow benefit and end of the required holding period, the 
valuation of investment relief is not based, necessarily, on the amount originally invested, I; but, rather, on 
the lesser of this and the bid price, Pbid, at the time of divestment; that is, on min(I, Pbid). 
 
More formally, the value of investment relief, which we denote VIR, is as follows over three periods 
(period from point of investment up to point of cash flow benefit; period between point of cash flow benefit 
and end of the required holding period; and period from end of the required holding period): 
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where { ab − } represents the number of discounting / compounding periods from time point a to time point 
b; Y represents the number of discounting / compounding periods in a year; and N represents the length in 
years of the required holding period. Notice that in the period prior to t’0 no adjustment is made in respect of 
restricted clawback, since there is a zero assumed clawback during this period (the investor is assumed not to 
have claimed / enjoyed the cash benefit of investment relief). This leads to the profile of investment relief 
valuation over time as shown in Figure 1 (which figure, for simplicity of profile, assumes that the bid price is 
always in excess of or equal to the initial subscription price). 
 
*** insert Figure 1 about here *** 
 
We now consider what the proceeds of sale are likely to be in the context of market maker’s bid or offer 
prices. The ‘standard market maker’s spread’ covers the market maker’s transactions costs, adjustment for 
operational risk, normal profits, etc. The market maker must post bid and offer prices at which it is prepared 
to trade. Faced with a buy order, the market maker must obtain shares and cannot, in the normal course, rely 
upon finding a financially distressed seller willing to part with his VCT shares without being recompensed 
for the value of investment relief. Therefore the offer (as relative to the bid) price will include not only 
standard market maker’s spread, but also a valuation of investment relief. Conversely, the market makers bid 
price reflects that fact that he anticipates selling VCT shares onwards on the secondary market to an investor 
who will not be able to enjoy, and therefore does not value, investment relief. 
 
The valuation of market maker’s bid / offer spread (which we can observe) follows from the above as: 
 
VIR + standard market maker’s spread (2) 
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A further impactor upon the theoretical model might be the valuation of roll-over relief available to VCT 
subscribers. This may also be valued, along with investment relief, within overall market maker’s spread, 
and abstracting from this may mean that model (2) under-estimates market maker’s bid / offer spread. Roll-
over relief value is, however, highly investor-specific and difficult to estimate. It is also likely to be at least 
an order of magnitude lower than the value of investment relief (being the discount rate in respect of 
payment deferral applied to a tax rate in turn applied to a principal sum). 
 
 
4. Data, hypotheses and methodology 
 
4.1 Data set 
 
The determination of the data set was influenced by the public availability of the required data and the 
necessity for sufficient within-VCT-required-holding-period data points. For each VCT, such points 
commence approximately ten months after the end of the tax year in which the VCT is established. 
 
The entire population of VCTs which had been listed up to 5th April 2002 was extracted from the 
Primary Market Fact Sheet published monthly by the London Stock Exchange, double-checked against the 
TrustNet database. After excluding the twelve VCTs with multiple classes of shares (see footnote eleven and 
Table 1) this led to a sample of sixty-five. The 5th April 2002 cut off date ensures that, for every VCT in the 
sample, there at least are two years of trading after its associated 31st January investment relief cash flow 
benefit date. 
 
For each VCT in the sample, all available Datastream daily data from 5th August 1994 to 18th March 
2005 for market maker’s ask price (Datastream item PA) and market maker’s bid price (PB) was extracted. 
In addition, for each sample VCT, daily number of customer bargains and daily number of shares traded in 
customer bargains over the same period were obtained direct from London Stock Exchange, through bespoke 
interrogation of LSE databases by LSE staff.13 
 
Although VCTs have a number of unique characteristics, there are some financial instruments which 
invest in similar areas and are listed. Two comparator samples of listed investment trust stocks were selected 
by searching the TrustNet database: searching for ‘UK Venture / Development Capital’ investment trusts 
yielded 13 trusts; and searching for ‘UK Equity Growth’ investment trusts yielded 29 trusts. All available 
daily data items as above were collected for these comparator samples. 
                                                 
13 Datastream data was collected on 18th March 2005. Collection of data up to this date ensured at least two years of 
data points within the required holding period of each sample VCT: the required holding period would have 
commenced 31st January 2003 for the most recently established VCT in the sample. In view of Datastream’s decision 
not to collect data on number of customer bargains and number of shares traded therein from 27th March 2002, it was 
necessary to complete the collection of the required data set by purchasing the volume data directly from the London 
Stock Exchange. As regards the VCT sample, a significant change to the VCT tax relief relating to capital gains tax 
deferral effective VCTs issues made on or after 6th April 2004 cautions against the inclusion of later-incepted VCTs in 
the sample. 
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For each sample VCT, its subscription date was established from the LSE Primary Market Fact Sheets 
and the date of the end of the required holding period deduced. Where multiple allocations of a single VCT 
share class were made, the date of the first was taken as the subscription date in order to maintain an 
assumption that market makers are rational and would not wish to under value the spread. In practice further 
allocations of a single VCT share class involved a relatively small number of shares. All VCTs in the sample 
were subscribed and allotted at a price of 100p per share. 
 
For each sample VCT and comparator, the price spread was calculated for each day upon which bid 
(PBt) and ask price (PAt) data was collected: 
 
ttt PBPASPREAD −=  (3) 
 
4.2 Hypotheses 
 
The special taxation treatments associated with VCTs, and the 6th April 2000 non-retrospective reduction in 
required holding period from five years, provide a context in which we may formulate and test hypotheses 
concerning the impact of tax considerations on valuation and market behaviour. The null hypothesis in each 
case is one of no such impact. 
 
Given valuation of investment relief by initial subscribers, we hypothesise as follows: 
 
Hypothesis A: The bid-offer spread of VCTs within the required holding period is higher than that for 
conventional investment trusts. 
 
Since investment relief is forfeit if a subscriber sells their VCT holding within the required holding period, 
and trades in this period are, therefore, likely to be infrequent: 
 
Hypothesis B: The volume of VCT shares traded within the required holding period is lower than that 
for conventional investment trusts. 
 
Since investment relief is certain for the subscriber as from the end of the required holding period: 
 
Hypothesis C: The bid-offer spread of VCTs falls immediately at the end of the required holding 
period, and remains at lower levels thereafter. 
 
From our modelling in the previous section, and focussing upon the magnitude (rather than merely the 
existence) of a pricing effect: 
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Hypothesis D: The bid-offer spread of VCTs includes a valuation of investment relief which is 
characterised by the theoretical modelling in the previous section. 
 
The value of investment relief, in the traditional asset valuation paradigm, is driven by future expectations 
and perceived risk. Therefore, given a shorter required holding period, ceteris paribus, the valuation of 
investment relief during the early life of a VCT will be higher: 
 
Hypothesis E: The bid-offer spread over the early life of VCTs subscribed prior to the reduction in 
required holding period is less than the bid-offer spread over corresponding periods in the lives of 
VCTs subscribed after the reduction. 
 
4.3 Methodology 
 
We consider in more detail descriptive statistics upon spread and volume data for our samples, segmented in 
various ways, and undertake comparison of means between various sub-samples. This includes descriptive 
statistics and comparable estimates for our comparator samples: although we may not assume that the 
comparators provide a perfect control, they are sufficient for the rather limited objective of comparing the 
general size of spreads and the amount of trading activity. 
 
We then undertake regression analysis aiming to model SPREAD, subsuming valuation of investment 
relief per our theoretical model. The objective of this analysis is to examine whether or not VCT spread 
evolves over the course of the required holding period in the manner anticipated and also whether or not the 
spread for VCTs is influenced by other factors in a manner similar to that for other stocks / investment 
vehicles. This section now continues with discussion of development of our sample for regression purposes 
and of development of a reasonable, estimable regression model. 
 
The value of investment relief variable VIR was computed by reference to the model developed in the 
previous. This describes the theoretical valuation of the investment relief, including adjustments for the rate 
of interest applied on overdue (clawed-back) tax. 
 
We must account also for other factors which may further affect the bid-ask spread. Stoll (1989) 
decomposes the spread on stocks into three factors - those related to adverse information, to the costs of 
holding inventory and to costs of processing orders. This is corroborated by Glosten (1987), who 
decomposes the spread into portions attributable to information asymmetry and ‘other’ elements 
(encompassing the factors of Stoll). Our estimates more closely follow the approach of Atkins and Dyl 
(1997), who do not include an adverse information effect in their estimates of the spread. The existence of 
and ability to exploit informational advantages in VCTs is theorised to be relatively small. The directors of 
the VCT may be in a position to exploit informational advantages being better aware of the holdings of the 
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VCT - directors’ stockholdings are, however, typically very small and change only very rarely14. We 
therefore include only factors related to inventory and processing costs in the empirical model. 
 
Atkins and Dyl (1997) model spread as: 
 
tttt VRETMVALSPREAD εββα +++= 21  (4) 
 
where MVAL represents market value, VRET represents the variance of returns and ε  is a stochastic error 
term.15 
 
The greater the market value of the firm, the greater the assumed depth of the market and, consequently, 
the lower the inventory costs. Consequently the expected sign on the coefficient 1β  is negative. The higher 
the variance of returns the higher the risk associated with holding the stock and the greater the inventory 
costs. Therefore, the expected sign on coefficient 2β  is positive. 
 
This model needs adaptation for our purposes because few VCTs are particularly large and the depth of 
the market is expected to change more with the performance of the VCT since inception than with the market 
value of the firm. The increased flows into high performing managed funds are well documented in the 
literature (see, for example Sirri and Tufano (1998)). Therefore, price is taken as a proxy for willingness to 
buy and hence the depth of the market. The variance of the stock over the previous 30 days is included as a 
measure of inventory costs, after Atkins and Dyl. Where available in our data set, other measures of market 
depth are included in the form of the number and volume of customer bargains in the previous 30 days. This 
gives an estimable model as follows: 
 
ttttttt VOLBARVBPBVIRSPREAD εβββββα ++++++= 54321  (5) 
 
where VIR represents the valuation effect of investment relief based upon our theoretical model; PB bid 
price; VB variance of the bid price over the previous 30 days (i.e., t-30 to t-1); BAR the number of customer 
bargains over the previous 30 days; and VOL the number of shares traded in customer bargains over the 
previous 30 days. 
 
VIR is calculated from expression (1) with the following assumptions and substitutions: t’i in respect of 
any fiscal year FYi is 31st January in the fiscal year immediately following (this being the due date for 
personal taxation in the UK, and the rational payment date for tax payers in a net payment position); Ti is 
20% for all relevant fiscal years, as per VCT taxation regulation; c over relevant periods is as obtained from 
HM Revenue and Customs; and discount rate r = 4% p.a. 
                                                 
14 Source: Various VCT annual reports. 
15 They also include an identifying variable in order to run a second stage model of the holding period which is not 
included here. 
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In this model, the expected sign of the VIR coefficient is positive, and that of the PB coefficient is 
negative. There is no firm sign expectation concerning the coefficient of VB: although increasing levels of 
variability are generally associated with increased inventory costs and, therefore, higher spreads, they might 
indicate a more active market and a resulting decrease in required spread. Neither are there firm expectations 
concerning the coefficients of BAR and VOL: increases in these variables are normally associated with 
increasing depth of market and, thus, decreasing spread, but, in the particular context of this paper, the 
occurrence of trades might stimulate market makers to increase spread. 
 
Before estimation of the regression, we must be satisfied as to the time series properties of the variables. 
Many financial time series follow a random walk (or test as such) and this may be true of the PB variable. If 
market makers set the spread as a percentage of the bid price, then the SPREAD variable itself might also be 
non-stationary. To evaluate the possibility that the variables are non-stationary, their time series were plotted 
and inspected; and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests were conducted for all the SPREAD time series 
and for all other series where the times series plots suggested non-stationarity.16 As expected, there were 
many cases where the bid price appeared to be of order of integration one (I(1)) and tested as such. There 
were also a few cases where the spread tested as I(1) as well. Fortunately, the solution in this context is 
relatively straightforward, since we are principally interested in the behaviour of the spread over the required 
holding period and so a short-run model is feasible. Therefore, we translated the regression model to be 
estimated in first differences, without affecting the interpretability and the expected signs of estimated 
coefficients: 
 
ttttttt VOLBARVBPBVIRSPREAD εβββββα +∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+=∆ 54321  (6) 
 
As discussed above, the VCT secondary market is relatively illiquid and this is reflected in a low level of 
variation is the spread of a number of VCTs. In order to have sufficient variation in the dependent variable 
the initial regression analysis excludes VCTs with less than 30 changes in the spread resulting in a reduced 
sample of eighteen VCTs. An examination of these eighteen VCTs suggests systematic differences with the 
remainder. In particular, the eighteen more active VCTs have a greater number of market makers registered 
to trade them when compared to the remainder17 The direction of the causality between the higher number of 
market makers and the higher variation in the spread is an empirical question.  
 
We pool the eighteen ‘active’ VCTs to produce a panel comprising 18 cross sectional units and 801 time 
series observations, resulting in a data set comprising 14,418 data points. A benefit of pooling is improved 
efficiency by using data with increased variability (Kennedy, 2003). As the number of cross sectional units is 
small relative to the number of time series observations, it is inappropriate to use conventional fixed or 
                                                 
16 See Enders (1995) for a discussion of the ADF test and appropriate responses where series test as  non-stationary. 
17 With three exceptions, the eighteen ‘active’ VCTs have as least two market makers - with four VCTs having three 
market makers. Of the other 47 VCTs, 24 had a single registered market maker, the reminder two or more. The 
difference in the proportion of VCTs with multiple market makers as between the eighteen active VCTs and the 
remaining 47 VCTs is significant at the 1% level, 2χ -stat. = -6.341 (1). 
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random effect models (Kennedy, 2003). Instead we employ a feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) 
estimator (Greene, 2000). As diagnostic tests indicate significant autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using 
Durbin-Watson and Breusch Pagan test statistics respectively, the FGLS estimator employed allows for 
group-wise heteroskedasticity and within-group autocorrelation. Given the usual criticisms of FGLS, in 
particular having to estimate unknown error structure, we also estimate using panel corrected standard error 
(PCSE) estimates (Beck and Katz, 1995). To assess the sensitivity of the results to the choice of the FGLS 
and PCSE estimators, we also report results based on a conventional fixed effects model (FEM). Therefore 
three sets of results are reported for the sample of eighteen VCTs. As a test of the robustness of the results 
we also report the FEM when estimated on the full sample of sixty five VCTs.18 
 
 
5. Results 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics and comparisons 
 
Panel A of Table 2 gives summary statistics upon the mean value of the SPREAD variable for our VCT and 
comparator samples.19 The statistics are segmented between ‘all periods’, then ‘prior to end of required 
holding period’ and ‘after end of required holding period’ (the last two being pertinent only to the VCT 
sample). Panels B and C of Table 2 follow with descriptive statistics upon the mean value of SPREAD as a 
percentage of bid price, and mean number of customer bargains per day. Table 3 shows the results of 
pertinent comparison-of-mean tests. 
 
*** insert Table 2 about here *** 
 
The mean absolute spread for all VCTs with a five-year required holding period is 18.956 pence, with 
daily spread ranging between 1 and 550 pence. By contrast, and in line with expectations under hypotheses A 
and D, the UK venture / development investment trust sector has a smaller mean spread of 9.602 pence over 
the same period. For UK growth investment trusts, the spread is smaller still, as is the standard deviation and 
range. Since there are rather more growth than venture / development investment trusts within our sample, 
combining the comparator samples results in statistics more closely resembling growth investment trusts. 
 
We expect the spread on VCTs to be larger during the required holding period (as compared to beyond 
it), in line with hypotheses C and D, and this confirmed by the lower half of Table 2, Panel A where the 
mean spreads post required holding period for VCTs with five-year and three-year required holding periods 
are, respectively, 12.277 pence and 12.910 pence; compared with 20.637 pence and 19.387 pence 
respectively during required holing period.. Our theoretical model also suggests that the VCTs with a three-
year required holding period are, ceteris paribus, likely to have a higher spread than those VCTs with a five-
                                                 
18 The FGLS and PCSE estimators require a balanced panel and are estimated over 801 observations per VCT, this 
being the shortest time series of the 18 VCTS. It is not possible to use these estimators on the full sample / population as 
the number of observations per VCT is not constant given their varying start dates. 
19 All of the VCTs in our sample were issued at a price of 100p per share. 
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year required holding period20. This, hypothesis E, however, is not confirmed by a mean spread within 
required holding period of 19.387 pence for VCTs with a three-year required holding period compared to 
20.637 pence for VCTs with a five-year required holding period. 
 
The price of our trusts are not constant over the sample period and this might naturally raise the concern 
that an interpretation of any differences in the absolute spreads will be misleading where market makers set 
spreads with regard, to some extent or other, of percentage of instrument value. Therefore, descriptive 
statistics upon spreads as a percentage of bid price are calculated and presented in Panel B of Table 2. Very 
similar conclusions may be drawn from this panel as are drawn from Panel A: we note that the spreads for 
VCTs are considerably larger than those for our comparator samples (consistent with hypotheses A and D); 
and that the spread for VCTs falls when the end of their required holding period is reached (consistent with 
hypotheses C and D). Here, however, consistent with the prediction of hypothesis E, spread as a percentage 
of bid price during the required holding period is seen to be greater for VCTs with three-year required 
holding periods than it is for those with five-year required holding periods. 
 
A further topic of interest is whether the volume of trading is relatively small for VCTs within their 
holding period as compared with after and in comparison to more conventional instruments. Customer 
bargains per day are chosen as the basis for analysis since we are interested in the influence of tax effects on 
individuals’ decisions (and including market maker bargains would not provide a basis on which to compare 
the effects of changing tax liability on private shareholders). Table 2, Panel C is in line with expectations and 
hypothesis B: VCTs are very thinly traded during their required holding period, in comparison to VCTs 
beyond their required holding period and, most markedly, in comparison to our comparator investment trusts. 
Albeit the data upon comparator samples in this respect is not fully controlled (for, e.g., number of units in 
issue or value), the results are, we submit, stark and compelling. 
 
Table 3 presents the results of formal tests of the difference between the means as discussed above. All 
differences are of the hypothesised sign, with one exception, and are significant at the 1% level. A 
commentary upon some of the key comparisons follows. 
 
*** insert Table 3 about here *** 
 
The second and third rows of Table 3, Panel A present tests of whether the spread for VCTs falls when 
their five-year or three-year required holding period ends. The differences of 8.361 pence and 6.477 pence 
are both of the expected sign and statistically significant at a 1% level. Following the discussion of the 
statistics in Table 2, comparison of VCTs and our other sampled trusts is more appropriate if undertaken for 
percentage as opposed to absolute spreads. Table 3, Panel B therefore presents a comparison of the mean 
percentage spreads. In the first row of Panel B, we see that the VCTs within a three-year required holding 
period have a significantly higher mean percentage spread than those with a five-year required holding 
                                                 
20 Many more VCTs came close to or reached the end of their five-year required holding period than was the case for 
those with a three-year term. Since we expect the spread to be greater as the end of the holding period is reached, this 
comparison biases against finding a difference in the spread for the different types of VCT. 
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period (the corresponding relationship not having been found in absolute spreads, however, in the first row 
of Panel A). We see in the second and third rows of Table 3, Panel B that percentage spread for VCTs falls 
when their five-year or three-year required holding period ends (in confirmation of the findings from Panel 
A, again significant at the 1% level in each case). 
 
Since the percentage spreads on our two comparator samples are only marginally different (see Table 2, 
Panel B), we select the combined comparator sample as a basis for comparison with VCT percentage spreads 
in Table 3, Panel B. In each comparison, the percentage spread on VCTs is significantly greater than that of 
the comparators. This finding in isolation may indicate merely that the spread on VCTs is greater than that 
on more conventional investment trusts because the market is thinner, irrespective of whether the required 
holding period has ended (and, therefore, market makers require a greater spread to cover higher inventory 
costs). This possibility is controlled for in our regression analysis (see below). 
 
Panel C of Table 3 provides results of comparisons of number VCT customer bargain per day before 
versus after the end of their required holding periods; and between VCTs and comparators. Although the 
mean number of VCT customer bargains is relatively small both before and after the end of their required 
holding periods, the number per day after the end of the required holding periods is about three times the 
number observed before the end of the required holding periods (difference statistically significant at the 1% 
level). Trading in VCTs is markedly thinner than in the comparator samples, significant at the 1% level, 
albeit this result is subject to foregoing caveats. 
 
5.2 Regression estimations 
 
An earlier section discusses the development of the empirical model. The empirical model (6) was estimated 
for the period from supposed cash benefit of investment relief until end of required holding period - that is, 
NYttt o +<<0'for , i.e., the ‘middle section’ of our model – using FGLS, PCSE and FEM estimation 
techniques. The estimation results are summarised in Table 4. 
 
*** insert Table 4 about here *** 
 
Each of the estimated models is significant, as indicated by the statistically significant log-likelihood 
functions in the case of FGLS and PCSE, and the F-statistic in relation to the FEM. When the FEM model is 
estimated over the population of VCTs the adjusted R2 of 3.8% is far lower than the corresponding value of 
48.9% when the estimation is performed using the sample of eighteen VCTs. This fall is to be expected 
because of the inclusion of additional VCTs with extremely low levels of variation in spread, one of the 
dependent variables. 
 
Considering the variable ∆VIR, in each of the three estimations based on the sample of eighteen VCTs 
the estimated coefficient was significantly greater than zero and close to the expected value of one. A similar 
result arises when the FEM estimation is based on the population. Therefore, there is strong support for the 
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hypothesis D, which is robust to variation in the method of estimation method and the changes in the sample 
composition. In all four estimations, the coefficient on ∆PB has the expected negative sign although in two 
cases, PCSE and FEM, the coefficient is not statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
The estimated coefficients relating to variance in bid price (∆VB) are generally consistent, being negative 
in three estimations out of four, but insignificantly different from zero in all cases. As regards the 
coefficients of the trading volume variables, the estimated coefficients of ∆BAR are consistently positive 
across all four estimations, although are significantly different from zero (at the 2.5% level) only in the cases 
of the PCSE and FEM(65) estimations; and the estimated coefficients of ∆VOL are completely consistent, 
being positive yet insignificant across all four estimations. Comment in sub-section 4.3 (above) concerning 
the non-predictability of the sign of the coefficients of the variance and volume variables in the current 
setting pertains. 
 
Spread does, therefore, evolve over time in the way that we expected as per hypothesis D; and there is 
evidence that VCT spread responds to factors such as price and volatility in a similar fashion to other 
instruments. In general these results confirm that tax effects are priced into the spread and that price and 
trading behaviour in the VCT market conforms to theory and associated expectations. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper documents theoretical and empirical evidence of a lock-in effect arising from the conditional 
nature of tax incentives provided to increase demand for Venture Capital Trust IPOs. In particular, VCT bid-
ask spreads evolve over time in a way that is consistent with investment relief being valued in the share price 
by the shareholder during the required holding period (after the end of which the spread falls significantly). 
Consistent with the influence of the required holding period on investor behaviour, the number of customer 
bargains is minimal during this period and increases significantly thereafter. Spread is greater for VCTs with 
a three as opposed to five-year required holding period. Further, although there are potential non-tax 
explanations, there is evidence that VCT spread is greater than and trading volume less than that for 
comparable non-VCT investment vehicles. Circumstantial evidence in the form of buy backs is also 
consistent with the presence of a lock-in effect. 
 
This study is novel in that the magnitude of the lock-in effect can be calculated with certainty without 
requiring access to confidential shareholder information. In addition, a further methodological opportunity is 
provided by an unexpected change in related taxation legislation (as regards length of required holding 
period). 
 
Our results lead to a questioning of the benefit of requiring VCTs to be listed companies. This is 
reinforced by the relatively low importance attached to exit strategy concerns by VCT shareholders at the 
time of subscribing. Although a listing may bring benefits such as increased monitoring - leading to reduced 
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agency costs between managers and shareholders - an interesting issue is whether this benefit exceeds the 
direct and indirect costs associated with obtaining and maintaining a full market listing. 
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Table 1 
VCT issues in fiscal years 1995/96 to 2001/02 and derivation of regression sample 
 
Fiscal year Amount raised 
(£m) 
Number of new issues Mean amount raised per issue
(£m) 
 
VCTs with five-year required holding period    
1995-96 138.6 10 13.86 
1996-97 30.2 4 7.55 
1997-98 90.0 8 11.25 
1998-99 135.9 7 19.41 
1999-00 112.3 8 14.04 
VCTs with three-year required holding period    
2000-01 176.9 15 11.79 
2001-02 66.4 13 5.11 
    
Total 750.3 65 11.03 
Further issues of additional share classes n/a1 12  
Total issues  77  
 
Source: Primary Market Fact Sheet, various months, London Stock Exchange. 
1Proceeds not disclosed in above source where amount falls below a de-minimis level. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
 n Mean SD Skew Kurt Min Max 
Panel A: Mean value of SPREAD in pence 
All periods        
 VCTs with a five-year required holding period 51,888 18.956 25.147 5.579 63.869 1 550 
 VCTs with a three-year required holding period 29,007 18.036 14.690 2.259 8.346 1 100 
 Comparator sample: UK venture / development 30,832 9.602 15.064 3.106 10.638 0.2 145 
 Comparator sample: UK growth 46,856 5.981 9.103 3.557 13.536 0.19 60 
 All comparators 77,688 7.418 11.965 3.624 15.434 0.19 145 
Prior to end of required holding period        
 VCTs with a five-year required holding period 41,453 20.637 27.537 5.145 53.919 1 550 
 VCTs with a three-year required holding period 22,958 19.387 15.592 2.169 7.398 1 100 
 All VCTs 64,411 20.191 23.980 5.259 61.709 1 550 
After end of required holding period        
  VCTs with a five-year required holding period 10,435 12.277 8.732 1.432 2.038 1 50 
 VCTs with a thee-year required holding period 6,049 12.910 8.882 1.045 0.899 1 40 
 All VCTs 16,484 12.509 8.792 1.284 1.577 1 50 
 
Panel B: Mean value of SPREAD as a percentage of bid price 
All periods        
 VCTs with a five-year required holding period 51,888 0.2741 0.3720 5.6996 58.4584 0.0106 9 
 VCTs with a three-year required holding period 29,007 0.3140 0.4640 6.8497 63.9911 0.0109 6 
 Comparator sample: UK venture / development 30,832 0.0410 0.0564 7.4489 84.7769 0.0001 0.905 
 Comparator sample: UK growth 46,856 0.0972 0.9011 17.0698 313.53 0.0007 19 
 All comparators 77,688 0.0749 0.7013 21.9404 520.277 0.0004 19 
Prior to end of required holding period        
 VCTs with a five-year required holding period 41,453 0.2871 0.4074 5.2879 49.7217 0.0106 9 
 VCTs with a three-year required holding period 22,958 0.3318 0.5064 6.5369 55.7175 0.0145 6 
 All VCTs 64,411 0.3031 0.4457 6.0461 56.0617 0.0106 9 
After end of required holding period        
 VCTs with a five-year required holding period 10,435 0.2224 0.1588 1.4997 5.3184 0.0110 2.5 
 VCTs with a thee-year required holding period 6,049 0.2465 0.2314 1.5730 1.6532 0.0109 0.8889
 All VCTs 16,484 0.2312 0.8905 1.6910 3.7140 0.1100 2.5 
 
Panel C: Mean number of customer bargains per day 
All periods        
 VCTs with a five-year required holding period 51,888 3.919 12.602 28.126 990.977 0 497 
 VCTs with a three-year required holding period 29,007 2.356 4.698 3.994 20.634 0 47 
 Comparator sample: UK venture / development 30,832 18.766 83.729 21.374 954.122 0 4510 
 Comparator sample: UK growth 46,856 7.495 14.495 13.816 442.933 0 638 
 All comparators 77,688 12.303 56.052 30.842 2044.325 0 4510 
Prior to end of required holding period        
 VCTs with a five-year required holding period 41,453 3.1022 13.6372 27.890 910.857 0 497 
 VCTs with a three-year required holding period 22,958 1.065 1.797 3.031 13.353 0 18 
 All VCTs 64,411 2.376 11.036 34.063 1377.24 0 497 
After end of required holding period        
 VCTs with a five-year required holding period 10,435 7.163 6.143 1.412 3.252 0 46 
 VCTs with a thee-year required holding period 6,049 7.253 7.956 1.843 3.726 0 47 
 All VCTs 16,484 7.200 6.864 1.699 4.013 0 47 
 
‘Mean’ statistics are calculated as the mean of daily time series, the elements of the daily time series being the mean over all 
pertinent VCTs or investment trusts for which required data was available on the trading day concerned. 
# excludes one VCT for which there was insufficient data. 
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Table 3 
Comparison of means 
 Difference in mean 
Hypothesised 
sign t-statistic Sig. 
Panel A: Mean value of SPREAD in pence 
VCTs within RHP: those with 3 yr RHP versus those with 5 yr RHP 1.2501 No 6.339 n/a 
VCTs with 5 yr RHP: within RHP versus beyond RHP -8.3605 Yes  30.628 * 
VCTs with 3 yr RHP: within RHP versus beyond RHP -6.477 Yes  31.010 * 
 
Panel B: Mean value of SPREAD as a percentage of bid price 
VCTs within RHP: those with 3 yr RHP versus those with 5 yr RHP -0.0447 Yes -12.200 * 
VCTs with 5 yr RHP: within RHP versus beyond RHP -0.0647 Yes -15.932 * 
VCTs with 3 yr RHP: within RHP versus beyond RHP -0.0853 Yes -31.010 * 
Comparator versus VCTs with 5 yr RHP, within RHP 0.2122 Yes 56.705 * 
Comparator versus VCTs with 3 yr RHP, within RHP 0.2570 Yes 51.666 * 
Comparator versus VCTs with 5 or 3 yr RHP, within RHP 0.2282 Yes 71.451 * 
Comparator versus VCTs with 5 yr RHP, beyond RHP 0.1475 n/a 21.407 * 
Comparator versus VCTs with 3 yr RHP, beyond RHP 0.1716 n/a 34.952 * 
Comparator versus VCTs with 5 or 3 yr RHP, beyond RHP 0.1563 n/a 51.738 * 
 
Panel C: Mean number of customer bargains per day 
VCTs with 5 yr RHP: within RHP versus beyond RHP 4.0608 Yes 29.600 * 
VCTs with 3 yr RHP: within RHP versus beyond RHP 6.1880 Yes 107.871 * 
Comparator versus VCTs with 5 yr RHP, within RHP -9.2008 Yes -32.198 * 
Comparator versus VCTs with 3 yr RHP, within RHP -11.2386 Yes -30.360 * 
Comparator versus VCTs with 5 or 3 yr RHP, within RHP -9.9271 Yes -43.276 * 
Comparator versus VCTs with 5 yr RHP, beyond RHP -5.1399 n/a -9.360 * 
Comparator versus VCTs with 3 yr RHP, beyond RHP -5.0500 n/a -7.002 * 
Comparator versus VCTs with 5 or 3 yr RHP, beyond RHP -5.1030 n/a -11.670 * 
 
The difference in mean of ‘x versus y’ is calculated as (y – x) 
* indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 4 
Results from estimation of ttttttt VOLBARVBPBVIRSPREAD εβββββ +∆+∆+∆+∆+∆=∆ 54321  
 
where VIR represents the valuation effect of investment relief; PB bid price; VB variance of the bid price over the previous 
30 days; BAR the number of customer bargains over the previous 30 days; and VOL the number of shares traded in customer 
bargains over the previous 30 days. 
 
 Estimation technique 
  
 where FGLS, PCSE and FEM are, respectively, feasible generalised least squares; panel corrected 
standard errors; and fixed effect estimators. These techniques are used for model estimation over the 18 
active VCTs. The last of the techniques is then used for estimation over the full sample of 65 VCTS. 
  
 FGLS PCSE FEM FEM(65) 
     
∆VIR 1.118 
68.217*** 
0.929 
24.343*** 
0.962 
6.962*** 
0.931 
7.244*** 
     
∆PB -0.131 
-30.073*** 
-0.017 
-1.501 
-0.018 
-0.194 
-0.086 
-11.220*** 
     
∆VB 0.639E-4 
0.160 
-0.336E-3 
-0.689 
-0.711E-5 
-0.004 
-0.346E-3 
-1.034 
∆BAR 0.012 
0.795 
0.087 
2.404** 
0.055 
0.708 
0.063 
2.478** 
∆VOL -0.118E-5 
-1.740 
-0.959E-6 
-0.554 
-0.621E-6 
-0.314 
-0.129E-5 
-0.810 
Constant n/a n/a 0.003 
0.203 
0.154E-3 
0.008 
     
n (18 VCTs) 14,399 14,399 14,399 47,308 
Likelihood Ratio 648.63*** 14,176***   
Adj-R2   0.489 0.038 
F   628.53**|* 
(22, 14376) 
36.88*|** 
(5, 47302) 
     
*, ** , *** indicate significance levels of 5%, 2.5% and 1% respectively. 
 
